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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
AtOMOBILES-GUEST DRiVER--LIAIL1TY OF OWNER--STANDARD OF
CARE -The defendant, the owner and operator of an overloaded truck,
requested the deceased, a guest passenger to drive. The defendant al-
legedly knew that the guest was not aware of the overload, was an inex-
perienced driver arid physically unable to manage an overloaded truck.
The guest was killed when the truck overturned due to its overloaded con-
dition. Held, demurrable in failing to show that the defendant was guilty
of gross negligence, if of any negligence at all. Sheffield v. Studor (Ga.
App. 1935) 178 S. E. 409.
There is no statutory law governing the situation in Georgia, the prin-
ciple of gross negligence was established judicially. Lee v. Lott (Ga. App.
1935) 177 S. E. 92; Epps v. Parrish (1921) 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E.
297. This minority view is sustained in a few jurisdictions: Massalatti V.
Fitzroi (1917), 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. (1918) C. 264;
Blood v. Austin (Wash. 1928) 270 Pac. 103; Boggs v. Plybon (1931) 157
Va. 30, 160 S. E. 77. In New Jersey liability attaches only where the host
has been guilty of wilful negligence. Faggioni v. Weiss (1923) 99 N. J.
Law 157, 122 Atl. 840. The position of Pennsylvania is not entirely clear.
Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Co. (1928) 292 Pa. 219, 140 Atl. 905;
Moquin v. Mervine (1929) 291 Pa. 79, 146 Atl. 443. In Missouri the host
owes the guest the duty of exercising the highest degree of care. R. S.
Mo. (1929) Sec. 7775, Kaley v. Huntley (Mo. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 21.
The great weight of authority however, is that the driver of an automobile
owes an invited guest the duty of exercising reasonable care in its opera-
tion so as not unreasonably to expose the guest to danger and injury by
increasing the hazard of travel. Thomas v. Carter (Ala. 1927) 117 So.
634; Olsen v. Hermansen (1922) 196 Wis. 614, 220 N. W. 203; Central
Copper Co. v. Kleflch (Ariz. 1928) 270 Pac. 629; Gurdin V. Fisher (Ark.
1929) 18 S. W. (2nd.) 345; Benjamin v. Noonan (Cal. 1929) 277 Pac.
1045; Warput v. Reading (1928) 250 Ill. App. 450; Note (1929) 65 A. L.
R. 952. No distinction is recognized between the guest who asked for the
favor and the guest who is invited by the host. Mitchell v. Raymond
(1923) 181 Wis. 591 1(5 N. W. 855. The rule also applies to a guest at
suffrance. Munson v. Rupker (Ind. App. 1925) 148 N. E. 169. The limita-
tion placed by the authorities upon the rule of ordinary care, to wit: that
it only applies in instances where there is involved an increase of an ex-
isting hazard, or the creation of a new peril, is significant in its implica-
tion that as to existing risks, such as might inhere in the mechanism of a
car, or the host's lack of mechanical knowledge, the rule is inapplicable.
Higgins v. Mason (1930) 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77.
In jurisdictions which pay homage to the gross negligence rule, if the
passenger injured was riding at the request and for the benefit of the
owner, the rule of ordinary care applies. Lytell v. Monto (1924) 248
Mass. 340, 142 N. E. 795. If he is an unwilling passenger he is entitled
to ordinary care. Blanchard v. Ogletree (1929) 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. E.
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116. The protest of the passenger for slower speed may not be sufficient
to entitle him to this protection. Wachtel v. Bloch (1931) 43 Ga. App.
756, 160 S. E. 97. In Massachusetts in cases when death has resulted the
rule of ordinary care is applied by statute. Gallup v. Lazatt (1930) 271
Mass. 406, 171 N. E. 658. It is difficult to find convincing reasons for the
proposition that while the plaintiff is a member of the general public, the
driver owes him the duty of ordinary care, but upon entering the automo-
bile, the driver's duty immediately shifts to that of slight care. One
justification urged has been that the guest is favored. Although the argu-
ment may be forceful when applied to this type of case, such a conclusion
is not applicable where the relationship is for the benefit and convenience
of the driver or their mutual benefit. See White, The Liability of an
Automobile Driver to a Non-paying Passenger (1912), 18 Va. L. R. 342,
et seq. It will not do to say that the driver owes no more duty to the
guest than a gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood. Munson v. Rupker,
supra.
J. L. A. '37.
CONTRACTS-FUTURE INSTALLIVIENTS-ECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.-In an
action on an accident insurance policy providing for monthly installments
to the insured during total disability, plaintiff seeks to recover accrued
installments to the commencement of his action, installments accruing be-
tween the commencement of the action and the trial, and to be granted a
declaratory judgment as to installments as they come due in the future.
The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff on all three grounds. Held,
on appeal, plaintiff is entitled to installments accrued at the commence-
ment of his action and to those accruing between the commencement of the
action and the trial, but he cannot recover, by resort to a declaratory relief
statute, installments due in the future. Brix v. Peoples Mu&ual Life In-
surance Co. (Calif. Sup. Feb. 20, 1935). 41 Pac. (2nd) 537.
Authority as to the right to judgments for future installments under
such an insurance policy is conflicting. In some jurisdictions, notably
Kentucky, they have been granted without the invocation of declaratory
relief statutes; usually contingent upon the continuation of the insured's
disability. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Hampton (1933)
252 Ky. 145, 65 S. W. (2nd) 980; Equitable Life Insurance Society of the
United States v. Branham (1933) 250 Ky. 472, 63 S. W. (2nd) 498.
Where the insurer has clearly indicated his intention not to perform in
the future the majority of states permit an action for breach of the en-
tire contract. Lovell v. St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Go. (1884) 111
U. S. 264; McKee v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co. (1859) 28 Mo. 383;
Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan (1915) 62 Ind. App. 567,
109 N. E. 851; Freeman, On Judgments (5th Ed. 1925), Vol. 3, pp. 2780-
2792; Williston on Contracts (1920), Vol. 3, Sec. 1328. In the absence of
such repudiation by the insurer, the general rule is that recovery may be
had only for accrued installments. Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Go. of
Cincinnati. (1932) 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38; Mid-Continent Life
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